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Entheogens: True or False?
Roger Walsh
University of California at Irvine
Irvine, California

Despite 40 years of dialogue, debate still continues over whether psychedelics are capable of
inducing genuine mystical experiences. This paper first reviews the arguments against this possibility and shows that all of them contain shortcomings. One reason the debate still continues is
that there has been no adequate theory of mystical states and their relationship to the factors
which produce them. Consequently a theory of mystical states based on Charles Tart’s systems
model of consciousness is proposed. This theory suggests how identical states of consciousness can
be induced by very different means, including contemplative practices and chemical substances,
and yet have different after-effects. Taken together, these ideas lead to the cautious conclusion that
some psychedelics can induce genuine mystical experiences sometimes in some people, and that
the current tendency to label these chemicals as entheogens may be appropriate.

Entheogens: True or False?

S

tates of consciousness believed to be sacred, and
drugs to induce them have been remarkably
widespread throughout human history
(Bourguignon, 1973; De Ropp, 1987). Historical
examples include Hinduism’s soma, the Zoroastrian
haoma, the Australian Aboriginals’ Pituri, Zen’s tea,
the kykeon of the Greek Eleusinian mysteries (Smith,
1964), and the wine of Dionysis Eleutherios (Dionysis
the Liberator) (Marrero, 2003). Contemporary examples include the native American peyote, the
Rastafarian ganja (marijuana), and the South
American shamans’ ayahuasca (Harner, 1973; Walsh,
1990). Clearly there has been wide spread agreement
across centuries and cultures that psychedelics are
capable of inducing genuine religious experiences
(Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1997; Grob, 2002; Hunt
Badiner, 2002; Roberts, 2001; Smith, 2000).
However, the story is very different in the West.
For centuries psychedelics were all but unknown, until
in the 1960s they came crashing into a culture utterly
unprepared for them. For the first time, a significant
portion of Western society experienced powerful
altered states of consciousness. Some of these were
clearly painful and problematic. Yet others were apparently transcendent and illuminating. Suddenly the
question of whether drugs can induce genuine religious and mystical experiences morphed from dry aca-

demic debates to pitched political battles.
The very names given to these curious chemicals
say it all. For nay sayers these drugs are “psychotomimetics” (mimickers of psychosis) or “hallucinogens” (hallucination inducers). For most people
and some apologists they are psychedelics (mind manifesters). More recently, some researchers have suggested that they can be entheogens (revealers of the God
within). Are they one or the other, can they really be
entheogens, or can they be all four, depending in part
on set and setting? In this paper I will primarily use the
more neutral term “psychedelic,” while building an
argument that they can sometimes be “entheogens.”
Unfortunately, careful analysis and dispassionate
discussion were long ago overwhelmed by political
posturing and media madness. Misinformation has
flourished. Some apologists denied the drugs’ dangers;
some opponents and even governments exaggerated
them. For example, drug opponents repeatedly misused shaky scientific research to bolster claims of neurotoxicity, a process that continues to the present day,
especially with MDMA (ecstasy) (Concar &
Ainsworth, 2000), though the actual nature and significance of MDMA induced neural effects remains
moot and much debated (Grob, 2002; Holland, 2001).
And yet the question—one of the most important
of all concerning these drugs—still remains: Can psychedelics induce genuine mystical experiences?
Stanislav Grof (2001, p. 270), the world’s most expeEntheogens
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rienced psychedelic researcher, concluded that “at present after 30 years of discussion, the question of
whether LSD and other psychedelics can induce genuine spiritual experiences is still open.”
At the present time, both research data and theory
suggest an answer to this decades old question. That
answer is a very qualified “yes.” Yes, psychedelics can
induce genuine mystical experiences, but only sometimes, in some people, under some circumstances. To
consider whether this conclusion is appropriate let us
examine the arguments used against it, the shortcomings of these arguments, recent research, and a theory
which may make sense of the research findings.

Arguments Against the Validity of
Drug-Induced Mystical Experiences

T

here seem to be five major arguments that have
been advanced to suggest that drug experiences
can never be truly mystical. Huston Smith (1964,
2000) summarized them superbly in “Do Drugs Have
Religious Import?” the most frequently reprinted article ever published by The Journal of Philosophy.
• The first argument is that some drug experiences
are clearly anything but mystical and beneficial.
• The second is the claim that the experiences
induced by drugs are actually different from those
of genuine mystics.
• The third point is a theological one, which argues
that mystical rapture is a gift of God that can
never be brought under mere human control.
• The fourth is that drug-induced experiences are
too quick and easy, and could therefore hardly be
identical to those hard-won by years of contemplative discipline.
• The final argument is that the after-effects of druginduced experiences are different, less beneficial,
and less long-lasting than those of contemplatives.
There are possible answers to each of these concerns.
Let’s consider them in sequence.
First, there is no doubt whatsoever that some, in
fact most, drug experiences are anything but mystical.
According to Huston Smith (1964, p. 520, 523),
There are, of course, innumerable drug experiences
that have no religious features; they can be sensual
as readily as spiritual, trivial as readily as transforming, capricious as readily as sacramental. If there is
one point about which every student agrees, it is
that there is no such thing as the drug experience
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per se.… This of course proves that not all drug
experiences are religious; it does not prove that no
drug experiences are religious.
The second question concerns whether drug and natural mystical states are experientially the same. Smith
(1964, p. 523) concludes that “Descriptively drug
experiences cannot be distinguished from their natural
religious counterparts.” In philosophical terms, drug
and natural mystical experiences can be phenomenologically (experientially or descriptively) indistinguishable.
The most dramatic experiment affirming this was
the “Harvard Good Friday study,” also known as “the
miracle of Marsh Chapel.” In this study, divinity students and professors were placed in a highly supportive
setting—Harvard University's Marsh Chapel during a
Good Friday service—and given either the psychedelic psilocybin or an inactive placebo. Several psilocybin
subjects reported “mystical experiences,” which
researchers were unable to distinguish from those of
mystics throughout the centuries (Doblin, 1991).
Perhaps the people best equipped to say whether
drug and contemplatively induced mystical experiences might be the same are those who have had both.
Such people are obviously few and far between.
However, several spiritual teachers concluded from
their own personal experience that they can be identical (Walsh, 1982).
The third argument—that mystical rapture is a
gift from God that could never be brought under
human control—will only seem plausible to those
people who hold certain very specific theological
beliefs. It would hardly be regarded as valid by religions such as Buddhism, for example, that do not
believe in an all-powerful creator God. Nor, presumably, would it appeal to those theists who believe more
in the power of good works than of grace.
The complaint that drug experiences are too quick
and easy to be genuine is readily understandable. After
all, it hardly seems fair that a contemplative should
labor for decades for a sip of what the drug user may
effortlessly swim in for hours. However, unfair or not,
if the states are experientially identical, then the fact
that they are due to different causes may be irrelevant.
Technically, this is called “the principle of causal indifference” (Stace, 1964/1988, p. 29). Simply stated, this
means that subjectively identical experiences can be
produced by multiple causes.
The final argument against the equivalence of

The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 2003, Volume 22

drug and natural mystical states is that they may have
different long-term effects. Specifically, it has been
suggested that drug-induced experiences may be less
likely to result in enduring, beneficial transformations
of personality and behavior. Once again Huston Smith
(1964, pp. 528–9) put the case eloquently. He concluded that “Drugs appear to induce religious experiences:
it is less evident that they can produce religious lives.”

A Theory for Understanding the
Varieties of Mystical Experience

S

o it seems that drug and natural mystical experiences can be subjectively similar or identical, but
may differ in their after-effects. This much is clear. But
still the debate continues over whether psychedelically
induced mystical experiences are “really genuine.”
One reason the debate continues unabated is that
there has been no theory of mystical states that could
resolve it. What is needed is a theory accounting for
the induction of similar or identical states by such different means as LSD and meditation, followed by possible different after-effects. It may now be possible to
create such a theory in light of current understandings
of the induction of altered states of consciousness.
Charles Tart's (1983) systems model of consciousness is helpful here. Tart suggests that any one state of
consciousness is the result of the function and interaction of multiple psychological and neural processes,
such as perception, attention, emotions, identity, etc. If the
functioning of any one process is changed sufficiently,
it may shift the entire system or state of consciousness.
For example, a yogi might focus unwaveringly on the
breath or a mantra, a Christian contemplative or bhakti
yogi might cultivate the love of God, a Sufi might
recite the name of Allah (dhikr), while Buddhist vipassana and Taoist internal observation practitioners
might explore their experience in minute detail
(Walsh, 1999). Yet despite their different practices, all
might eventually be rewarded with mystical experiences. [Whether different traditions can induce identical internal breakthroughs and in what ways they may
differ is a long and complex debate. For arguments
that the experiences of different traditions are necessarily different see Katz (1983). For arguments that they
can overlap see Forman (1990), Walsh and Vaughan
(1993), and Wilber (2000). Clearly there are multiple
kinds of religiously induced mystical experiences just
as there are multiple kinds of psychedelic experiences.

Fortunately we don’t need to go into these complexities to investigate whether some psychedelic experiences may overlap some mystical experiences.]
It therefore seems possible that a specific altered
state may be reached in more than one way via altering different processes. For example, states of calm
may be reached by either reducing muscle tension,
visualizing restful scenery, repeating a pacifying
thought, releasing agitating emotions, focusing attention on the breath, or ingesting valium. In each case
the brain-mind process used is different, but the resulting state is similar, a consequence which systems theorists call “equifinality.”
A similar phenomenon may occur with mystical
states. Different techniques might affect different
brain-mind processes, yet still result in similar or identical mystical states of consciousness. A contemplative
might finally taste the bliss of mystical unity after years
of cultivating qualities such as concentration, love, and
compassion. Yet it is also possible that a psychedelic
might affect chemical and neuronal processes so powerfully as to at least temporarily induce a similar state.
So it therefore seems that Tart's theory of consciousness may provide an explanation for the finding
that “chemical mysticism” and natural mysticism may
be experientially identical. But what of the claim that
the long-term impact of the two may be quite different? As we will see, this claim may also be compatible
with the theory. But first we need to consider whether
the claim that the long-term effects of chemical mysticism are less beneficial and enduring is actually true.

Long-Term Effects

I

n fairness, we need to acknowledge that, contrary to
common arguments, psychedelic mysticism can
sometimes have an enduring impact. Huston Smith
(2000), for example, described just such as impact on
himself, as did Frances Vaughan (1983), while Sherana
Harriette Frances (2001) portrayed hers in a series of
exquisite drawings. Likewise, Charles Tart (1991)
found that a significant number of Buddhist
retreatants had been drawn to spiritual practice following psychedelics, while all of the Harvard Good Friday
psilocybin subjects interviewed more than twenty
years later reported that their original experience had
made a uniquely valuable contribution to their spiritual lives (Doblin, 1991).
But even if we were to assume, as do many
Entheogens
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researchers and most critics of psychedelics, that the
drugs have relatively little long-term benefit, is this so
surprising? Or is it so different from other powerful
experiences? After all, the transformation of experiences and insights into enduring change is one of the
challenges of transformative disciplines in general.
Psychoanalysts say, “insight is not enough,” while clinical psychologists speak of breakthroughs and regressions, and of the “problem of generalization,” i.e., the
problem of getting insights on the couch to generalize
to daily life. Likewise, learning theorists describe
“spontaneous recovery,” whereby newly learned behavior fades and old patterns revive (Masters et al., 1987).
It is true that powerful experiences can sometimes
induce enduring “quantum change” (Miller & C’de
Baca, 2001). On the other hand, most people suffer
from a “false hope syndrome” and underestimate just
how hard it is to change ingrained habits (Polivy &
Herman, 2002).
The same is true of religious disciplines. Profound
experiences can sometimes effect enduring change, but
often tend to fade unless stabilized by further practice,
as Phillip Kapleau makes clear for Zen:
Even the Buddha continued to sit. Without joriki,
the particular power developed through zazen [seated meditation], the vision of oneness attained in
enlightenment in time becomes clouded and eventually fades into a pleasant memory instead of
remaining an omnipresent reality shaping our daily
life. To be able to live in accordance with what the
mind’s eye has revealed through satori requires, like
the purification of character and the development of
personality, a ripening period of zazen (Smith,
2000, p. 31).
A single spiritual experience is no guarantee of a spiritual life or an ethical lifestyle (Barnard & Kripal, 2002;
Novak, 1989; Smith & Novak, 2003). However, longterm practice and multiple experiences appear to have
a cumulative impact (Vaughan, 2000; Walsh, 1999).
With the occasional exception of “quantum change”
(Miller & C’de Baca, 2001), no matter what the
method used, major enduring transformation usually
requires long-term practice (Leonard & Murphy,
1995; Mahoney, 1991; Murphy, 1992). The universal
challenge is to transform peak experiences into plateau
experiences, epiphanies into personality, states into
stages, and altered states into altered traits, or, as I
believe Huston Smith once eloquently put it, “to transform flashes of illumination into abiding light.”
4

So the usual transience and limited long-term
effects of psychedelic mystical experiences turn out to
be far from unique. Rather, they reflect one of the central problems of psychological and spiritual growth:
the “problem of stabilization” (Walsh, 2001).
But let us assume the critics’ position. Let’s assume
for the moment that chemical mysticism is less transformative than contemplative mysticism, as it might
well be. Why might this be so?
Both psychological and social factors may be
involved. The psychedelic user may have a dramatic
experience, perhaps the most dramatic of his or her
entire life. However, a single experience, no matter
how powerful, may be insufficient to permanently
overcome mental and neural habits conditioned for
decades to mundane modes of functioning. The contemplative, on the other hand, may spend decades
deliberately working to retrain habits along more spiritual lines. Thus, when the breakthrough finally
occurs, it visits a mind already prepared for it. In addition, the contemplative probably has in place a belief
system and worldview to make sense of the experience,
a discipline to cultivate and stabilize it, a tradition and
social group to support it, and an ethic to guide its
expression. One is reminded of Louis Pasteur’s statement that chance favors the prepared mind. The contemplative’s mind may be prepared, but there is no
guarantee whatsoever that the drug user’s is.
It turns out, therefore, that different long-term
effects of chemical and contemplative experiences
could occur, even if the original experiences are identical. Consequently, none of the five common arguments against psychedelic experiences being genuinely
mystical seem to hold. This argument by itself does
not prove that some drug-induced mystical experiences are necessarily the same as some spontaneous
mystical experiences. However, when coupled with the
phenomenological evidence, it certainly makes this
possibility seem likely.
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Summary
In summary, it seems that some drugs can indeed
induce genuine mystical experiences in some people
on some occasions. However, they may be more likely
to do so in prepared minds, and more likely to produce
enduring benefits when the experience is followed by
long-term practice of a transformative discipline.
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